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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the regulatory systems for the private security
industry in the European Union (EU). Building upon other studies to
compare regulatory systems it proposes a much more sophisticated
approach to assess the quality of regulatory systems using 22 different
criteria based on two areas: legislation and societal foundations. From
this analysis a maximum of 100 points are possible and the paper is able
to rank 26 of the 28 member states of the EU. The league table ranks
Belgium and Spain as having the most comprehensive regulatory
systems in the EU. The paper then provides analysis of some of the key
ﬁndings from the league table noting some of the implications. One of
the most important of which is the substantial differences between
member states and the challenges this poses for an effective single
market in the provision of security services.
Introduction
In the European Union (EU) the private security industry has assumed a substantial `position in the
provision of policing in most Member States (Jones and Newburn 2006, Ocqueteau 2006, Van
Steden and Sarre 2007, CoESS 2011). In a number of countries there are statistics, admittedly of
varying quality, showing more private security staff employed than public police ofﬁcers (Republic
of Ireland, UK) and in other countries there are substantial private security sectors employing well
over 150,000 staff (Germany, Spain and the UK) (Small Arms Survey 2011). These trends are not
unique to the EU, with many other areas of the world also experiencing substantial growth in size
and role of the private security industry (Shearing and Stenning 1982, Cunningham et al. 1990,
Button and Park 2009, Palmer and Button 2011, Small Arms Survey 2011). The involvement in poli-
cing, the frequent exercise of legal powers, the use of force – sometimes deadly, along with the par-
ticular sensitivities of the security function including (the need to ensure the probity of staff);
combined with a variety of problems associated with growing private security industries, such as
criminal inﬁltration, poor standards and excessive use of force, to name some, have all combined
to encourage states to introduce special regulatory systems for private security (De Waard and
Van De Hoek 1991, De Waard 1993, 1999, Button 2007a, CoESS 2011). The quality of these regulatory
systems has varied considerably. In the EU, some countries have been noted as implementing some
of the most demanding regulatory systems (Button 2008, Prenzler and Sarre 2008). The systems,
however, vary in how exacting they are (De Waard 1993, Button 2007a, 2012, CoESS 2011). These
systems are also constantly been reformed and changed.
Juxtaposed to the need for regulation of private security is the increasing integration of the EU and
the creation of a single market. The private security industry is treated as a major business services
sector and this is despite some attempts by Member States to secure a similar status to state security
apparatus (CoESS 1998). As such the private security industry would be exempt from these provisions,
which the state security apparatus already is. However, such attempts have failed, which means the
private security industry is treated like any other business service industry and a private security
company or operative legitimately operating in one Member State can do so in another based
upon the home country authorisation. As this paper will show, notwithstanding, there are signiﬁcant
differences in standards, not only hampering the notion of a single market but also opening up some
interesting opportunities for exploitation for the ruthless.
The purpose of this paper, nevertheless, is not to highlight these opportunities. Rather, it is to
compare the regulatory systems of the countries of the EU. Note that it is the regulatory systems
that are compared, not the compliance thereof. Comparative research in criminal justice has
not been extensive and even less so for private security (Jones and Newburn 2006, Pakes 2004).
Such approaches offer many beneﬁts, as Jones and Newburn (2006, p. 2) argue, ‘Comparative
criminological research is essential in order to better understand similarities and differences within
and between jurisdictions, and to gain a deeper understanding of social reality in different national
contexts.’ Which is an argument for creating a league table like this one as good as any, with an end
product open to opinions, criticism and scholarly review. All subsequently leading to anything from a
total dismissal of league tables altogether, although unlikely, to the development of a comparative
base for European policy-making. Where this research, if nothing else, can act as a starting point
for a more nuanced and informed debate, on local, national and supranational level alike, on
where to go next with private security regulation in Europe.
One example of such criminological research, adjacent although not perfectly aligned with this
approach is the work of Hough et al. (2012) about the police analysed along the dimensions of
public trust and perceived legitimacy. The ﬁndings are summarised as, trust in the police is an
important factor in shaping people’s sense of police legitimacy, and trust in police fairness is
the crucial dimension across Europe. The model used group countries into the following types:
Neoliberal; Conservative corporatist; Social democratic corporatist; Southern European; Post-com-
munist and Israel. The typology introduced could make for an interesting comparison with the
ﬁndings of this research though not permitted within the conﬁnes of this paper. Same goes
for another perspective presented by Lacey (2008) in her book ‘The prisoners’ dilemma: Political
economy and punishment in contemporary democracies’. The overarching question posed by
Lacey is ‘under which conditions are political systems able to combine, in their penal policy, a
respect for democratic representation and social inclusion?’ The analysis focused on the penal
system examine key institutional differences between national systems – an analysis that could
be adapted and adopted in a comparative discussion related to this research.
More to the point, there have also been previous attempts to compare regulatory systems in
Europe and elsewhere in the world (De Waard and Van De Hoek 1991, De Waard 1993, 1999, Prenzler
and Sarre 1999, Hemmens et al. 2001, Button and George 2006, Sarre and Prenzler 2011). There have
also been attempts at a league table of the private security industries and regulatory systems (see
Button 2007a, Berglund, n.d.), however not to the extent and detail offered in this paper. The
scope, however limited, and subsequent content, however ﬂawed, is quite ambitious in comparison
to the few previous data collations in a European context. Also generally on the global scene the
existence of league tables of this sort are scarce, probably more as a result of the inherent difﬁculties
in data collection in some parts of the world rather than contested usefulness. Thus, in short, this
paper seeks to provide a comparison of the regulatory systems of the EU, based on and illustrated
by a league table. It also uses a set of criteria that have been developed from the recent work of
the United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime, among others, as a foundation to create an ideal fra-
mework for the regulation of private security in Europe (UNODC 2014).
The paper will start by examining previous research on the comparison of private security across
countries, with a speciﬁc focus upon regulation. The paper will then outline the methods used for this
research to construct the league table. Next the league table of EU states will be presented, with
further sub-analysis. The implications of the ﬁndings from the league table are then examined, with
particular reference to the single market, before offering a conclusion.
European private security, regulation and comparison
Comparing statistics on police numbers poses a signiﬁcant challenge because of the different roles
they undertake across countries (Stenning 1989). However, statistics on the size of the private security
industry pose even greater challenges because they are notoriously variable in their quality and the
methodologies vary signiﬁcantly across countries, not to mention deﬁnition differences, high labour
turnover rates and a substantial number of part-time employees to name some (Van Steden and Sarre
2007). There has, nevertheless, clearly been a substantial growth in the numbers of private security
staff in the countries of the EU (CoESS 2011). The problems with the comparison of statistics relating
to private security staff, makes the authors uneasy about offering a European comparison as much of
the data on statistics on the size of private security it is difﬁcult to investigate the quality of the
methods used. So rather than offer a complete picture of the EU the size of the private security
sector, by numbers employed, relative to the police in the ﬁve largest EU economies is presented
to illustrate some of the wide differences. The largest per capita private security sector is the UK at
527.8 staff per 100,000, which compares to 78.7 in Italy. However, Italy has a much larger number
of police ofﬁcers. Spain has a large private and public sector, but the public sector is still bigger,
with only the UK having a bigger private sector than the public. In France, Germany and Spain the
ratio of private security staff to public police ofﬁcers are all fairly comparable (Table 1).
The growth in size of civilian private security has been matched in many Member States by expan-
sion in role. Many of the functions traditionally assumed by the public police are undertaken by
private security, such as the patrol of public areas, investigation of crimes, exercising powers such
as search and arrest, the provision of armed guarding services, to name some (Jones and
Newburn 1998, Hainmuller and Lemnitzer 2003, Gimenez-Salinas 2004, Ocqueteau 2006, Button
2007b, Van Steden 2007, CoESS 2011). The presence of uniformed guards in mass private spaces,
such as shopping malls, universities, hospitals, gated communities and entertainment zones, or at
the doors of hotels and banks, is now ubiquitous in most EU countries, as is their role in protecting
government facilities such as ofﬁce complexes and critical infrastructure, including transportation
hubs and energy facilities (Hainmuller and Lemnitzer 2003, Wakeﬁeld 2003, Gimenez-Salinas 2004,
Button 2007b, Van Steden 2007, CoESS 2011). As well, private individuals with the means to purchase
personal security where public policing services may be weak or seen as ineffective help grow the
industry (Davis 1998, Johnston and Shearing 2003, Crawford and Lister 2004).
In the broader ﬁeld of private policing research, private security regulation has secured signiﬁcant
attention among researchers, although the totality of private policing research is still relatively small
compared to public policing research. Research on regulation of private security has tended to
encompass cases for regulation (Hakala 2008), the political context to regulation (White 2010),
critiques of existing systems or parts of them (Prenzler et al. 1998, Gimenez-Salinas 2004, Button
2011, Cihan 2013, Santonen and Passonen 2014) and comparison of state systems in federal
Table 1. Police and private security staff statistics compared in the ﬁve largest economies of the EU.
Country Population
Police
ofﬁcers
Private
security staff
Police ofﬁcers
per 100,000
Private security staff
per 100,000
Private security staff to
police ofﬁcer ratio
France 65,856,609 203,982 147,000 309.7 223.2 0.72
Germany 80,780,000 243,982 168,000 302.0 208.0 0.69
Italy 60,782,668 276,750 47,858 455.3 78.7 0.17
Spain 46,507,760 249,907 188,000 537.3 404.2 0.75
United
Kingdom
64,308,261 160,566 339,440 249.7 527.8 2.11
systems or in regions of the world (Cunningham et al. 1990, Prenzler and Sarre 1999, De Waard 1993,
Hemmens et al. 2001, Weber 2002). Comparisons have tended to follow basic criteria such as sectors
covered by regulation, levels of training, licensing conditions and so on. An exception is the work of
Button and George (2006) and Prenzler and Sarre (2008) who have identiﬁed models of regulation for
private security drawn from cross system comparisons. The former authors have produced models of
regulation based upon several criteria. These include the width of regulation, which is the extent of
private security industry subject to regulation. Wide systems regulate beyond the manned guarding
and private investigatory sectors to cover security consultants, security equipment installers, whereas
Narrow focus on manned guarding and or private investigators. The depth of regulation, which is the
extent regulations apply to enhance the quality of the private security sector, by setting standards for
employees and companies and by setting standards beyond character for owners and employees
with training and minimum standards of operation (Button and George 2006). Comprehensive
systems set standards of entrance for ﬁrms and individuals, with operating conditions for the
former and training standards for the latter. Minimal systems by contrast fall short in one or more
of these areas. Button and George (2006) also argued systems can be compared by levels of compli-
ance, offering a simple high or low binary classiﬁcation – but also acknowledging there is a lack of
data to offer scholars much to go on for this division. Finally Button and George (2006) noted regu-
latory systems could be compared on whom has responsibility between monopoly and divided. The
former has one body responsible for regulation, which was their preferred option; while the latter has
multiple, either based upon territory, that is, different bodies covering different areas of a country or
functional, where distinct parts of the private security sector have different regulatory bodies.
From the ﬁrst two criteria, depth and width, Button and George (2006) offered ﬁve models of regu-
lation. Non-interventionist is the ﬁrst, where the country has no regulation. Then there are Minimum
Narrow and Minimum Wide, followed by Comprehensive Narrow and Comprehensive Wide, the ﬁnal
of which is their preferred option. The model has provided a useful means to compare systems and
offer a basic insight on how good they are. However, as more regulatory systems have been intro-
duced and reformed, particularly in a European context, many of the systems have moved into
the Comprehensive Narrow or Wide models. The only signiﬁcant difference being picked up by
this model is the width of regulation, failing to detect the substantial differences that still exist
between systems in how deep they are. To try and offer greater sensitivity to differences Button
(2007a) developed the only league table of private security regulatory systems of the then 15 EU
Member States. That study only focussed upon the static guarding sector, when in reality the industry
and many regulatory systems are much broader than this (this was because of the lack of publicly
available data available to do a full analysis at the time). It also only used ﬁve criteria, partially
linked to the Button and George model.
The aim of this paper is, using the analogy of astronomers, seeking to better understand space is
to build a much more sophisticated and sensitive telescope with which to view private security regu-
latory systems. To do this the paper builds upon the work of Button and George (2006), Prenzler and
Sarre (2008) and Button (2007a) by creating a much more sophisticated tool for analysis and league
table based upon an examination of the wider regulatory system, but also rooted in the foundations
of the key criteria for regulation set out in the UNODC Handbook (2014) State Regulation Concerning
the Civilian Private Security Services and their Contribution to Crime Prevention and Community Safety
and other appropriate guides. The way the handbook is written made the task of turning the criteria
into points an onerous one. Nevertheless, through a process of independent assessment, debate and
reﬂection the authors arrived at the points system that will shortly be discussed. The authors do not
see the criteria and points as the ﬁnal destination of the research, rather as the ﬁrst attempt, which
hopefully will stimulate further debate and reﬂection as well as suggestions for reform.
Such debate could stem from traditional considerations on regulation as presented by Loader
(1997) centred around the normative aspects of locating private security within some kind of frame-
work of democratic deliberation and decision-making. Given that private security does not sort well
as any market controlled commodity there is certainly scope for comparative analysis across the EU
on the connection between the provision of security and political authority. The analysis can also be
extended to further typologies such as that presented by Smith and White (2014) who by adding a
layer of complexity end up with the following three regulatory objectives: public protection, regulat-
ory capture and normative legitimation. Regulatory legitimacy is often discussed from the perspec-
tive of substantive and procedural legitimacy, but seldom normative legitimacy. In the neoliberal
setting present in many EU Member States there is contention such that it potentially give rise to
a paradoxical relationship between public protection and normative legitimation. This rather counter-
intuitive notion could also serve as basis for expansion of the league table both in terms of its rational
foundation as well as its content.
This will gradually create a set of criteria and points for analysis which will gain wide acceptance
across the EU and possibly even broader. The end point is to create a transferable structure with wide
acceptance, the authors accept there will be critique of their approach but are prepared to ‘put their
heads above the parapet’ to start the debate. Ultimately the authors are committed to effective regu-
lation, as the means to enhance the important contribution of private security to crime prevention
and community safety and believe this paper will contribute to the body of knowledge to help
states achieve this. Regulation is seen as essential to achieving this, although this does not mean
that all regulation is good. Regulation must be tailored to enhancing private security and not hinder-
ing or smothering it, which can occur. The authors’ perspective throughout is therefore that tailored
regulation is good, providing the normative basis for an effective private security industry operating
to high standards contributing to crime prevention and community safety. Conversely bad or no
regulation undermines standards and the contribution to crime prevention and community safety.
In that context this paper is important in drawing out some of the normative aspects of private secur-
ity regulation.
Methodology
The purpose of the league table is to illustrate the current state of private security regulation in the
Member States of the EU. This is realised by identifying a number of questions pertinent to the issue,
ascribing these questions a relative weight, assigning an individual value and by adding up these
values creating a league table. The questions were determined by ﬁrst synthesising the inquisitive
paradigms of the following four resources. Firstly, the 2014 UN Handbook on state regulation con-
cerning civilian private security services (UNODC 2014). The Handbook provides a broad outline
and analysis of essential regulatory requirements for private security services. Secondly, the Private
Security Services in Europe – Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS) Facts & Figures
(CoESS 2011) providing a comprehensive overview of the European private security services land-
scape. Thirdly, the ECORYS report on security regulation, conformity assessment and certiﬁcation pro-
duced for the European Commission (ECORYS 2011). This report describes the ﬁndings from a study
on security regulation, conformity assessment and certiﬁcation The fourth resource was the article by
Button (2007a), which in and by itself is based on the three studies of private security regulation by
the CoESS and Union Network International Europe (Weber 2002, CoESS/UNI-Europa 2004, CoESS
2004), accompanied by the latest edition of the CoESS facts and ﬁgures for private security services
in Europe (CoESS 2011). In addition to these reports several other sources were subsequently used.
These sources include various other European studies, academic research articles and reports, gov-
ernment websites and interviews with industry professionals, all of which are cited where used.
What arose from the synthesis of the three ﬁrst resources was not only the emergence of a con-
ceptual framework outlining the fundamentals of private security regulation in the EU, but also a
number of contextual requirements essential to the stability of the framework. It was these require-
ments that were translated into the questions pertaining to the legislative side of private security.
Also of importance as a counter balance to and product of the legislation, is the societal foundation,
the actual implementation of legislation into the private security industry. Not exactly equally
balanced as the latter is largely the product of the former this made up the fundamental structure
Figure 1. The sub-divisions and questions of the league table.
for the calculations to come. Thus the deﬁnition of these twomain divisions can loosely be deﬁned as;
legislation, those aspects pertaining directly or indirectly to the actual national legislative framework,
and the societal foundation as the direct or indirect consequences of that legislation upon its
implementation into the society.
The formulation of the questions, the weight of each question, that is, the maximum value, as well
as the various partitions of points within an individual question was determined by a method resem-
bling constant comparison (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Pidgeon and Henwood 1997). For this research
this meant formulating initial questions from the ﬁrst data analysed and then allowing those ques-
tions to evolve as further data was analysed. This method was applied also when assigning weight
and values to the questions, constantly reﬁning and balancing the array of questions in the league
table. The method, although changing the nature of the questions as the research progressed,
allowed the analysis to reach a higher level of abstraction – drawing out, adjusting for and integrating
integral and pertinent aspects making the entire league table be far greater than the sum of its parts.
The ﬁnal set of questions, their weight and the balance between the technical aspects of the
rather theoretical legislation with the pragmatically oriented practical effects thereof is illustrated
by Figure 1.
Before embarking on this analysis, however, it is important to note some caveats. Regulations are
constantly changing and consequently many of the sources consulted are soon out of date. Thus,
exploring different systems of regulation can be viewed at best as a snapshot in time. Second, the
data presented in some studies do not always match others and this may reﬂect use of dated
sources, a genuine mistake by an author or differences in interpretation of legal regulations.
Another important aspect intentionally omitted from this work is the level of compliance to the
various regulatory systems. The research has been focused on comparing the theoretical foundation
as laid out by the legislation in each Member State, with the practical implementation of the same
may be the focus for another study. Bearing these caveats in mind, however, all efforts have been
made to verify the data used for this paper so that it represents as accurate a snapshot of regulation
as is possible at the time of writing.1
In answering the questions that emerged a three-pronged approach was applied. Firstly, extant
literature on the subject was reviewed. Centring on the same resources that were used for the
creation of the questions, several answers were found in these or related writings. The second
step, since most national legislation is publicly available, was a desktop-based process in which ofﬁ-
cial documents were reviewed. This further ﬁlled the gaps and also provided some of the countries
with more updated information. Still having some areas unanswered the third and last step com-
prised the use of the authors’ networks. Establishing direct or indirect contacts, the latter as a
result of snowballing, the ﬁnal gaps were ﬁlled. Leaving all but two countries (Croatia and
Hungary), readily available for further analysis.
The league table
Two countries were excluded from the league table due to insufﬁcient data and another two contain
minor gaps that allow them to still remain in the analysis. Excluded countries are Croatia and
Hungary; the countries with minor gaps are Latvia and Slovakia. Hence a total of 26 of the 28 EU
Table 2. Overall score six top and bottom performers, plus the EU founding countries.
Top performers Score Bottom performers Score EU founding countries Score
Belgium 94 Slovakia 50 Belgium 94
Spain 88 Italy 46 Luxembourg 68
Slovenia 82 Cyprus 42 Germany 66
Greece 80 Lithuania 42 France 64
Sweden 78 Austria 40 Netherlands 62
Portugal 78 Czech Republic 22 Italy 46
Table 3. The league table showing criteria and score for 26 EU Member states (1).
EU member
state
Year
of
entry
Legislation/
regulation
type
Single
regulatory
body
Role of PSI
in
regulation Regulation
Scope of
licensing
regulation
Prohibitions/
restrictions
In-house
security
personnel Coverage
Licensing
ﬁrms
Licensing
operatives
Types of
licenses
License
card
Compulsory
codes of
conduct
Special
equipment
and weapons
Working
conditions
4 2 4 10 10 2 4 16 8 8 4 4 2 2 2
Belgium 1952 4 2 4 10 10 2 4 16 8 8 4 4 0 2 2
Spain 1986 4 2 0 6 12 2 4 18 8 8 4 4 0 2 2
Slovenia 2004 4 2 4 10 10 0 4 14 4 8 4 4 2 0 0
Greece 1981 4 2 2 8 10 0 4 14 8 4 0 4 2 2 2
Sweden 1995 4 0 2 6 10 2 0 12 4 4 4 4 0 2 2
Portugal 1986 4 2 2 8 10 0 4 14 8 4 4 4 0 2 2
Ireland 1973 4 2 4 10 10 0 4 14 4 8 4 4 2 2 2
Finland 1995 4 2 4 10 8 0 0 8 8 8 3 4 0 2 2
Romania 2007 0 0 4 4 10 0 4 14 4 8 0 4 0 2 0
Luxembourg 1952 4 2 4 10 8 2 0 10 4 4 0 4 0 2 2
Germany 1952 4 2 2 8 6 0 0 6 8 4 2 4 2 2 2
Malta 2004 4 2 2 8 4 0 4 8 8 8 2 4 0 0 2
France 1952 4 2 4 10 8 2 4 14 4 8 0 4 2 2 2
Netherlands 1952 4 2 0 6 10 0 0 10 4 8 0 4 0 0 2
Estonia 2004 4 2 0 6 6 0 4 10 4 8 0 4 0 2 2
Poland 2004 0 2 0 2 4 0 4 8 8 4 0 4 0 2 2
Denmark 1973 4 2 4 10 4 0 0 4 4 8 0 4 0 2 0
Latvia 2004 4 0 0 4 4 0 4 8 8 4 0 4 0 0 0
Bulgaria 2007 4 2 4 10 4 0 4 8 4 0 0 4 0 2 0
United
Kingdom
1973 4 2 4 10 10 0 0 10 0 8 4 4 0 0 0
Slovakia 2004 4 2 4 10 6 0 6 0 0 0 4 0 2 0
Italy 1952 2 2 0 4 8 0 4 12 4 4 0 4 0 2 2
Cyprus 2004 4 2 0 6 10 0 4 14 4 8 0 4 0 0 2
Lithuania 2004 0 2 0 2 6 2 0 8 4 8 0 4 0 0 0
Austria 1995 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 8 4 8 2 0 0 2 2
Czech
Republic
2004 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 4 0 2 0
(Continued)
Table 3. Continued.
EU member
state Licensing
Subtotal –
legislation
Professional
associations
Professional
associations
Complaints
procedure
Sanctions for
transgressions Enforcement
Licensing
of trainers
Mandatory
training Exam
Refresher
training
Specialist
training
Management/
supervisor
training Training
Subtotal –
social
foundation Total
30 56 4 4 4 4 8 4 14 2 4 4 4 32 44 100
Belgium 28 54 4 4 0 4 4 4 14 2 4 4 4 32 40 94
Spain 28 52 4 4 0 4 4 4 14 2 4 4 4 32 40 92
Slovenia 22 46 4 4 0 4 4 4 10 2 4 4 4 28 36 82
Greece 22 44 4 4 0 4 4 4 14 2 4 0 4 28 36 80
Sweden 20 38 4 4 0 4 4 4 14 2 4 4 4 32 40 78
Portugal 24 46 4 4 0 4 4 4 6 2 4 4 4 24 32 78
Ireland 26 50 4 4 4 4 8 4 4 0 0 4 0 12 24 74
Finland 27 45 4 4 0 2 2 4 12 2 0 0 0 18 24 69
Romania 18 36 4 4 0 4 4 4 14 2 0 4 0 24 32 68
Luxembourg 16 36 4 4 0 4 4 4 10 2 4 4 0 24 32 68
Germany 24 38 4 4 0 4 4 4 6 2 0 4 4 20 28 66
Malta 24 40 4 4 0 4 4 4 3 2 4 4 0 17 25 65
France 22 46 4 4 0 4 4 0 8 2 0 0 0 10 18 64
Netherlands 18 34 4 4 0 4 4 4 14 2 0 0 0 20 28 62
Estonia 20 36 4 4 0 4 4 4 8 2 0 0 4 18 26 62
Poland 20 30 4 4 0 4 4 0 14 0 4 0 4 22 30 60
Denmark 18 32 4 4 0 4 4 4 12 2 0 0 0 18 26 58
Latvia 16 28 4 4 0 4 4 4 14 2 0 0 0 20 28 56
Bulgaria 10 28 4 4 0 4 4 4 6 2 0 4 4 20 28 56
United
Kingdom
16 36 4 4 0 2 2 0 6 2 0 4 0 12 18 54
Slovakia 6 22 4 4 4 4 8 4 6 2 0 0 4 16 28 50
Italy 16 32 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 2 0 0 0 6 14 46
Cyprus 18 38 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 42
Lithuania 16 26 4 4 0 0 0 4 6 2 0 0 0 12 16 42
Austria 18 26 4 4 0 4 4 4 2 0 0 0 0 6 14 40
Czech
Republic
14 16 4 4 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 22
Member States are included and analysed in the league table. The ﬁrst level of analysis is naturally to
look at the total score achieved by each individual Member State. With the top performers being
Belgium with an overall score of 94 out of a maximum 100, followed by Spain with 88 and then Slo-
venia with 82. On the other side of the spectrum the two countries Cyprus and Lithuania, share third
place from the bottom with 42. Austria is second to last with 40 and last by some degree is the Czech
Republic with 22. As reference countries Sweden takes ﬁfth place with 78 and the UK comes in eight-
eenth with 54. Table 2, an excerpt presenting the six overall score top and bottom performers
together with the founding countries of the EU.
The average total scoreiμ, for the 26 Member States is 64 – the exact score of only France but
coincidentally also the average of the ﬁve largest economies of the EU discussed earlier. As other
interesting comparisons the Scandinavian average (Denmark, Finland, Sweden) is 68 and the Med-
iterranean average (Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Spain) is 67. With several aver-
aged total scores ending up in the same region as the total average the next question
beckoning is that of the variance. Treating the 26 countries as the entire population, which is
true at least for the conﬁnes of the analysis, the uncorrected standard deviation, σ is 16. Assuming
a normal distribution the countries outside the normal distribution of the ﬁrst band (μ ± 1σ) from
48 to 80 can be identiﬁed. Above are Belgium (94), Spain (92) and Slovenia (82), the countries on
the lower side are Italy (46), Cyprus (42), Lithuania (42) Austria (40) and the Czech Republic (22). The
second band (μ ± 1σ) from 31 to 97 singles out the Czech Republic falling below the lower delimi-
ter on what can only be considered an alarmingly low total score. The league table can be found in
its entirety in Table 3.
The overall score provides an indication of the quality of the regulatory system in each Member
State, nonetheless it is in essence just an expanded more detailed version of the same sort of analysis
provided by Button (2007a). This increased level of detail is evident when for instance looking at
Belgium getting a perfect score of 100 in the original study and in the current table losing a total
of six points due to the lack of a compulsory code of conduct and a formalised complaints procedure.
Having said that, only ﬁve countries have a compulsory code of conduct and only two have a formal-
ised complaints procedure. Though it should be noted that the more advanced methodology applied
for this league table in many respects yield the same result as the table by Button in 2007. For the
ﬁfteen countries then analysed, the two countries given a full score in 2007 are the same countries
that are ﬁrst and second in this league table. Conversely the table from 2007 placed UK and Italy
among the bottom three which corresponds to the current league table.
The sub-divisions shown earlier do, however, lend this league table to further and deeper analysis.
As an example one can look at the top performers of the main division, legislation on one hand and
societal foundation on the other. To no surprise Belgium comes in ﬁrst in both categories, but in
second place for legislation Spain has to give way to Ireland. For societal foundation the three
countries of Belgium, Sweden and Spain all share ﬁrst place. This type of sub-division analysis can
be extended to the groupings of questions, that is, regulation, coverage and licensing, all under the
heading of legislation as well as professional associations, enforcement and training which pertains
to societal foundation. For example, when looking at coverage, comprising of the scope of regulation,
the prohibitions and restrictions therein as well as whether or not in-house security personnel are
included in regulation, Belgium is the only country with a faultless score. That indicates that
almost all of the EU Member States have regulation which does not completely cover the principal
activities of the private security industry, which would be expected to be included.
In an attempt to ﬁnd the main issues pertaining to comprehensive regulation an in-depth analysis
of the various sub-divisions going all the way down to individual questions was performed. The analy-
sis, fundamentally built upon questions intentionally designed to be blunt allowing for easy and fair
assignment of discrete values, delivered equally blunt answers. In this case blunt is not necessarily
bad, but rather it quite clearly highlights three key issues that an effective regulation for private secur-
ity must address. Those key issues are, the inclusion and emphasis of quality enhancing standards,
recognising and addressing the complexity of private security and to have a wide yet sufﬁciently
speciﬁc range of regulation.
If ﬁrstly looking at the inclusion and emphasis of quality enhancing standard the ﬁndings of this
study concur with the observations in the UN Handbook (UNODC 2014) that regulated standards and
norms allow private security to make a more effective contribution to society, which builds upon a
body of research (see e.g. De Waard 1999, Button and George 2006, Button 2007a, Hakala 2008, Pren-
zler and Sarre 2008). A contribution including the enhancement of human rights, ﬁghting crime and
upholding criminal justice. To exemplify, the case of an appropriate amount of mandatory training
addresses not only the proﬁciency and efﬁcacy of security personnel, but would also negate many
of the identiﬁed weaknesses of the industry. Such weaknesses can be the abuse of authority, exces-
sive use of force, low professional standards, and non-compliance with the law. The minimum train-
ing stipulated by this research is 120 hours for an unarmed guard, a ﬁgure developed by using the
CoESS European Training Manual for a Security as the basis (European Private Security Services Edu-
cation and Training 1999). Yet there are only seven countries that mandate this or more in the EU:
Romania (360 hours), Hungary (320 hours), Sweden (288 hours), Poland (245), Spain (180 hours),
Latvia (160 hours) and Belgium (127 hours) (in the Greece and Netherlands there are mandatory
diplomas rather than hours). The rest fall below this, with a handful mandating no or little more
than a few days training (Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ireland, Malta, Poland, UK). Although
beyond the scope of this paper, particularly considering the limited amount of words available,
these ﬁndings do lead to other interesting questions; such as how this is derived from the respective
national legislative framework, and the speciﬁc context therein. It is of course also important to note
that just because there are standards, this does not mean that all companies will follow them and that
even those that do, that they will have the desired impact. There is much evidence of non-compliance
and one only has to look at extensive standards leading to increased training for police ofﬁcers in
interviewing in England and Wales, but still extensive problems with standards regularly exposed
(Milne and Bull 1999, Button 2012). Nevertheless some standards are clearly better than none.
The second point is to recognise and address the complexity of private security pertains not only to
the design but also the implementation of a regulatory system enhancing the contribution of private
security to crime prevention and community safety. Because even once the decision is taken to regu-
late, regardless if it is on a nation state level or supranational level, an informed decision must be taken
about how it is to be implemented. This is a complex issue that will determine the strength of the regu-
lation, the level of detail, if it should be implemented as new general legislation or as secondary legis-
lation amending the existing. The position taken by the authors based upon conclusions drawn from
this study is that at this point private security regulation needs to be addressed by the EU creating a
harmonised least level of regulation and conformity. This notion will be further explained shortly.
The third and last point of having a wide yet speciﬁc range of regulations stem partly from the fact
that the growth of the private security in sheer size is matched only by the expansion of its role.
Private security companies now undertake many of the functions traditionally assumed by the
public police. An effective regulatory system has to be sufﬁciently wide to encompass even the
very fringes of this ever-expanding role, while at the same time provide such depth and detail to
address sensitive areas. Such areas include, but are not limited to, data protection, ethics and integ-
rity, as well as enacting authority and using force. This is a signiﬁcant challenge with a solution that
has to incorporate the institutional cornerstones of the EU, such as the notion of the single market,
social and judicial equality as well as the ambition to secure the citizens of Europe. Further, effective
EU legislation must also contain an extensive feasibility analysis where the cultural and geopolitical
aspects of the Member States are addressed. In the context of regulating private security this is an
area in much need of further research.
So where does this analysis leave us? Firstly, taking the analysis before and during the creation of
the league table together with the post product analysis, it all clearly points towards not only the
necessity of private security regulation in general but even more so on a supranational level in a Euro-
pean context. Secondly, while evidently showing the direction where private security regulation
needs to be headed the analysis also identiﬁes several areas surrounding this particular path with
issues and questions left unanswered. Before divulging into a thought provoking discussion about
this, lets delineate the rational for the necessity of a European legislative framework for private
security while at the same time highlighting some of the challenges to achieving this.
Implications of the league table
There are several implications of the conclusions drawn from analysing the league table each equally
pertinent in its own right within its own context. Nonetheless there are also implications that are
wider in nature, representing the broad brush strokes that would colour the future bright. Externally
such broader strokes include EU Security Sector Reform undertakings, spanning both institutional
and operational activities. The experience from these reformatory efforts has highlighted the need
for improved coordination among instruments as well as between instruments and political goals
(Gross 2013). For an internal application one such instrument is the regulation of private security.
While coordination undoubtedly contributes to the effectiveness of any actual or proposed regu-
lation, such coordination should rest upon common operational guidance and understanding that
underpins the application of the regulation. This is particularly important since private security regu-
lation currently reside within the legislation of the individual Member States with different insti-
tutional and organisational cultures. With the continued emphasis on the coherence between EU
instruments and regulation perhaps it is time for the subsidiarity principle to step aside for a
better, fairer and more secure Europe?
If and when it does a rocky road of developing a supranational directive that could secure a broad
level of acceptance across the entire spectrum of civil society within the EU lies ahead. To facilitate com-
pliance further comparative research would be advisable and an analysis of how the Member States
would lend themselves to transposition of a private security directive is one suggestion. Falkner
(2007) presents a useful typology to this end suggesting three worlds of compliance: a ‘world of law
observance’, a ‘world of domestic politics’ and a ‘world of transposition neglect’. Comparing and
sorting the Member States of the EU from the speciﬁc perspective and challenges of private security
it could shed some light on when and how individual theoretical propositions are relevant.
Obviously this is a much larger discussion and what is presented below can only be considered to
scrape the surface. Nontheless, there are at least two angles that deserve to be mentioned, if nothing
else to stimulate the debate and further research. These are, ﬁrstly the perspective from a European
Single market, and secondly in the context of harmonised regulatory ﬁtness.
The European Single Market, allows people and businesses to move and trade freely across
borders within the EU, has transformed the way Europeans live, work, travel, do business and
study. It has opened up opportunities for businesses to expand successfully not only on the European
but by extension also on the global market. Over the years, a number of changes have made this
possible. Trade barriers and physical customs controls have been abolished – if still demanded or
required provided by private actors. National rules that prevented companies from trading across
borders have been harmonised – with such trades secured primarily by private actors. Public procure-
ment rules have been changed so companies can bid on contracts anywhere in the EU – also for
private security calling for equal yet somehow unregulated opportunities. In the early years of the
single market, now turning 20, the free circulation of services was less developed than that of
goods. With services being one of the most dynamic sectors of the European economies, many bar-
riers also in the service sector has been lifted. This allows for companies to offer services in another
Member State without prior authorisation from the EU or a particular license other than what
required in the country in which the company resides. The differences in private security regulation
as demonstrated by the league table do not align well with the ambitions of a functioning and fair
single market. In a market driven by price the widely different standards opens up the opportunities
for the ruthless to use the lowest standards to drive down overall standards, something familiar in low
or non-regulating states (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 1995, Goold et al. 2010).
Fairness also extends beyond the immediate business setting in many ways encompassing the
entire society of which security is an important part (Johnston and Shearing 2003, Button 2008).
Socio-inequalities are on the rise almost everywhere in the world, including Europe and while
research convincingly shows that egalitarian societies are associated with higher levels of economic
growth (Perrons and Plomien 2010) actual progress to reach those levels are slow. By contrast
unequal societies experience higher rates of crime, ill-health drug abuse, and persistent poverty
(Wilkinson and Pickett 2009) – factors not irrelevant to the continued growth and importance of
the private security sector. EU policies for combatting social inequalities involve directives, regu-
lations or decisions often referred to as ‘hard law’ instruments; but also include ‘soft law’ measures
that provide a framework and funding for national strategy development and policy coordination
between Member States. In light of the ﬁndings of this research, whether through soft or hard
law, there is an imminent call for coordination and harmonisation. The beneﬁcial societal effects of
regulating the private security industry would not necessarily stop with levelling social rifts but
through its intrinsic nature would also beneﬁt to the security and safety of Europe’s citizens.
One of the priorities of the Stockholm program set out in 2009 is protecting the citizens of Europe.
The program, which deﬁnes the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within
the area of freedom, security and justice, came to an end in 2014. A study commissioned by the Euro-
pean Parliament (2013) on its successor shows a current imbalance between harmonisation and oper-
ationalisation due to regulatory gaps. On a grand scale the EU has developed many instruments that
touch upon the realm of private security and others are still in the process of being negotiated. This to
the extent that the European Policy Centre in a document to support the Justice and Home Affairs
Ministers (2013) stressed the need to properly implement the enormous amount of already existing
legislation versus the need to adopt new rules in order to fulﬁl already deﬁned objectives. Needless to
say the league table conﬁrms that the regulatory gaps persists and with the increasing size, role and
importance of private security any lapse in developing and implementing cohesive legislation may
jeopardise the adequate protection of Europe’s citizens. In this era of globalisation, where barriers
of movement of goods, services and people are diminishing, the citizens of Europe expect their gov-
ernments to ensure their safety. Whether achieved through national or supranational legislation is of
less concern, but vis-à-vis the varied regulation as illustrated by the league table meeting the chal-
lenge on a national level may be an insurmountable task. The European Commission recently
launched the Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (COM 2012), it will combine various
initiatives underway aimed at eliminating unnecessary regulatory cost and ensuring that the body
of EU legislation remains ﬁt for purpose. Perhaps the initiative as the authors will take issue with
the lack of regulating an area where the EU can make a real difference.
Conclusion
This paper has presented a new more sophisticated tool for analysing systems for the regulation of
the private security sector. We did examine other research tangent to this research and there are cer-
tainly grounds for further development along those lines although not permitted in this paper. There
are limitations to this approach, not least the constantly changing regulatory systems and absence of
consideration of levels of compliance, which to be assessed effectively would require a resource
intensive large cross-EU research project. The authors do not expect the criteria used for assessing
systems to be the ﬁnal version, but rather the foundations for a tool that will be reﬁned as the
debate over effective regulation of private security continues. The analysis has been applied to 26
of the member states, which produced Belgium at the top with 94 points and the Czech Republic
at the bottom with 22 points. The average total score is 64 and the standard deviation 16.
Perhaps most signiﬁcant to the scores and allocation of points is the signiﬁcant difference
between Member States as well as the large variance. This, the authors argue raises signiﬁcant chal-
lenges to a EU effective single market in the provision of security services in the EU. In addition it
Exposes the weaknesses in the potential of some States – given the importance of regulation in
the promotion of standards of security – to develop minimum standards of security for citizens and
address security inequity. Like so many other areas in policing more research and debate is required
on this subject and the authors hope this paper provides the spark for much more attention to this
comparatively neglected area. One of the ﬁrst priorities of the authors will be to reﬂect further on the
implications for EU policy reform and develop a more focussed set of ideas on the best way forward
for the EU on the regulation of private security.
Note
1. 1. For the results of this research to potentially be replicated, critiqued and enhanced what follows is an expla-
nation of the allocation of points in relation to the answers of the 22 questions. The decision to let the total sum of
points for all questions be 100 was taken arbitrarily. It is considered a suitable level of detail given the total
number of questions and them intentionally being formulated to yield discrete answers. There is nothing that
indicates that a scale with a range of 1000 would have given fundamentally different results but would undoubt-
edly result in a more time consuming process when allocating the points. Particularly since the many of the
various intra-question levels are determined qualitatively and each would arguably require being ten times as
precise both in accuracy and justiﬁcation. Hence, in both pragmatic and conceptual terms the scale to 100
was as easily managed, as it is intrinsically easy to understand and relate to.
Firstly there is a main division of questions in two large groups, legislation representing 58 of the total points
on one hand and societal foundation representing 42 points on the other. The points given for each of these div-
isions was a result of the points allocated to the questions within them and not the other way. Ergo, having
created the main divisions each division were then subsequently divided into sub-divisions and those in turn con-
sists of individual questions. Allocating points to the questions gave a total score for the sub-divisions that when
added up produced the total for eachmain division. The near 50–50 balance was therefore not intentional, strived
for or even necessary yet still quite welcome as this also adds to the conceptual accessibility of the matrix.
Each sub-division consists of a number of individual questions that are presented here in a slightly simpliﬁed
format. The bracketed number following either a sub-division or an individual questions indicate the sum of
maximum points for that sub-division and question, respectively. Each individual question is followed by a break-
down of the answers within that question including allocated points associated with each particular answer. The
main divisions are legislation and societal foundation. Beginning with the main division legislation, the three sub-
divisions are regulation (10), coverage (18) and licensing (30).
Regulation consists of the following three questions (R1–3):
R1. Legislation/Regulation type (4). Where regulation speciﬁc to private security gave (4), general legislation with
speciﬁc amendments addressing private security issues (2) and general legislation (0).
R2. Single regulatory body (2). If a single regulatory body was effectively responsible for all or most private security
concerns (2) and if the responsibility was divided or diffuse (0).
R3. Role of PSI in regulation (4). If formally and democratically established and run (4), if informal but inﬂuential (2),
if having a dominating role, formal or informal (0), and if not holding a signiﬁcant role in regulation (0).
Coverage consists of the following three questions (C1–3):
C1. Scope of licensing regulation (10). Up to (10) for scope going beyond general standards with (2) for each area.
This refers to regulated areas falling outside of general guarding, e.g. CIT, close protection, private investigators, etc.
C2. Prohibitions/Restrictions (2). If regulation contains a Speciality principle (2) and if not (0). The ‘specialty prin-
ciple’ in private security means that one single legal entity, ofﬁcially recognised as a private security company, is
only allowed to carry out private security services and not auxiliary or additional services.
C3. In-house security personnel (4). If in-house security personnel, i.e. privately managed staff providing security
services, is included in regulation (2) and if not (0).
Licensing consists of the following seven questions (L1–7):
L1. Licensing ﬁrms (8). If regulation contains comprehensive criteria (8), partial (4) and none (0). Criteria included
but where not limited to consideration of; background checks, criminal records, ﬁnancial viability, fees, age restric-
tions, minimum educational level, language proﬁciency, etc.
L2. Licensing operatives (8). If regulation contains comprehensive criteria (8), partial (4) and none (0). Criteria
included but where not limited to consideration of; physical and psychological evaluations, criminal records, train-
ing certiﬁcates, fees, age restrictions, minimum educational level, language proﬁciency, etc.
L3. Types of licenses (4). Different licenses may be issued for different roles and if such differences reﬂect a com-
prehensive licensing spectra (4), if partial (2) and if not (0). Licenses included but where not limited to; aviation/
airport security, CCTV related, close protection, CIT, maritime security, etc.
L4. License card (4). If a license card meeting the ofﬁcial EU standard for ID cards is issued (4) and if not (0).
L5. Compulsory codes of conduct (2). If existing (2) and if not (0). Note that this is one of the questions where
compliance and adherence is highly relevant but as stated before was not considered.
L6. Special weapons and equipment (2). This question refers to the regulation of allowing guards to be armed with
ﬁrearms. If it is regulated and consequently allowed or disallowed (2) and if unregulated (0).
L7. Working conditions (2). In legislation that affects the PSI, i.e. not necessarily speciﬁc for the PSI, are there sector
speciﬁc binding agreements for working conditions? If yes (2) and if no (0).
The second main division is societal foundation consisting of the sub-divisions professional associations (4),
enforcement (8) and training (30).
Professional associations is the only one-question sub-division consisting of only (A1).
A1. Professional associations (4). If there are professional associations assumed to promote higher, better and
more effective standards than the statutory minimum, then (4), if not (0).
Enforcement consist of the following two questions (E1–2):
E1. Complaints procedure (4). If regulation provides speciﬁc provisions for making, managing and follow-up of
complaints against private security individuals and/or entities then (4) if not (0).
E2. Sanctions for transgressions (4). This question refers to the possibility for the regulator to administer sanctions
upon the security industry or individuals by criminal law (2), if also by administrative law (4) and if not at all (0).
Training consists of the following six questions (T1–6):
T1. Licensing of trainers (4). Is a license required to provide training of security personnel? If yes (4), and if
not (0).
T2. Mandatory training (14). This question weighed mandatory training stipulated by the regulation. The range of
hours, whose maximum value is justiﬁed in the article, provide the following range of points; 0 hours = (0), 1 to 19
hours = (2), 20 to 39 hours = (4), 40 to 59 hours = (6), 60 to 79 hours = (8), 80 to 99 hours = (10), 100 to 120 hours =
(12), and 121 + hours = (14).
T3. Exam (2). Upon successfully completing the basic training is there a theoretical and/or practical pass/fail exam
after which private security guards are issued with a certiﬁcate of competence (2), and if not (0).
T4. Refresher training (4). Does mandatory refresher or follow-up training exist? If yes (4) if not (0).
T5. Specialist training (4). If mandatory specialist training is required for security roles other than general guarding
then (4) and if not (0).
T6. Management/Supervisor training (4). If mandatory training is required for management and/r supervisory
roles of private security then (4) if not (0).
With simpliﬁed questions and several qualitative criteria judged subjectively the picture is not perfect but illus-
trates both the inter-question balance as well as their individual relevance.
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